Skip to content
covey

Guard-rails & control

The question that decides whether agents get used in a company is not "can it do this?" but "what happens when it gets it wrong?". covey answers with three things: enforced boundaries, approvals in the right places, and a recording that holds up afterwards.

Why not in the prompt

"You must not delete customer data" in the prompt is a request. It helps in the normal case and fails exactly when it matters: on an unusual phrasing, on text from a ticket that reads like an instruction, on a change of model.

Guard-rails therefore sit outside the runtime. The agent cannot read them, talk them round or bypass them — all it notices is that an action was refused. In case of doubt it is refused, not let through.

The three places it applies

  • Secrets broker — which access, at which scope, for which run. A token that never enters the sandbox cannot be carried out of it.
  • Egress — where the sandbox may talk at all. With the docker provider a proxy sits between agent and internet and enforces the allowlist — by default, unless an operator sets COVEY_EGRESS_ENFORCE=false. Hard network isolation (COVEY_EGRESS_ISOLATION=network) takes away the way around it.
  • Action layer — which action is allowed, which needs an approval, which is forbidden. Rules apply globally, per department or per agent.

Approvals

Critical actions stop and wait for a human. The defaults after installation show the pattern: an outbound reply to a customer needs an approval, HR systems are off limits, anything called delete is hard-denied.

Meanwhile the agent sits in blocked — it waits without consuming compute and continues as soon as the approval arrives.

Recording

Every run is written down: tool calls with arguments, target-system actions, approvals with the person who decided, screenshots for browser work, plus tokens and cost per model. This is the part audit and data protection want to see — and the part that lets you understand a misstep afterwards.

Kill switch

One switch stops an agent. A second stops the organisation's entire workforce. Both take effect immediately and running sandboxes are torn down. It is the answer to the question that comes up in every security review: "And if we have to stop all of this?"

Cost as a boundary

A budget per agent is a guard-rail too — the one against the mistake that hurts nobody except the invoice. Once it is used up, the agent stops working.

Next

Frequently asked questions

Can an agent change its own guard-rails?

No. They live in the control plane, not in its configuration, and are enforced outside the runtime. A human with the right role can change them — and that change appears in the audit trail.

What is the difference between an egress allowlist and an approval?

The allowlist decides which hosts the sandbox may talk to at all — technically, on the network. An approval decides a single business action, such as a reply to a customer. One is a wall, the other is four eyes.

Does this help against prompt injection from a ticket?

It is precisely the reason for the design. Text from a target system can mislead the model — but it cannot change a rule that lives outside the model. The action then fails at the guard-rail and lands in the recording as a refused attempt.

How long are recordings kept?

As long as you configure — it is your database. Retention is configurable, and what your audit needs is your decision, not the platform's.